This paper studies the distribution of income within neighborhoods and contrasts it with the national income distribution. It relies on a unique feature of the American Housing Survey, whose 1985, 1989 and 1993 waves of interviews provide data for small residential neighborhoods. These consist of a dwelling unit and up to ten of its nearest neighbors. Most previous work on neighborhoods has used information for much larger groupings of the population, such as census tracts. The paper employs a variety of parametric and nonparametric econometric tools to study income sorting across US residential neighborhoods. It documents the patterns of dependence among neighbors' income and imperfect sorting, with moderate but very significant correlation among incomes of neighbors and of considerable income mixing in U.S. neighborhoods. JEL classification codes: D31, C14.
Introduction
Research in economics and sociology has examined whether or not U.S. residential areas exhibit much more sorting by income, relative to what would occur if households were randomly drawn from the national income distribution and assigned to communities. This question has motivated a vast amount of research, especially starting with Tiebout (1956) , who sought to explain the endogenous formation of communities in economies where local government use taxes to provide for public services. Individuals are seen to sort themselves into communities according to their willingness to pay for local public services. More recently, attention has been directed to the role of sorting in the reproduction of economic inequality. Prominent theoretical contributions in this area are by Durlauf (1996) and Benabou (1996) , who study community formation jointly with human capital in the presence of social spillovers. Among empirical contributions, a notable one is by Kremer (1997) , who shows that although parents' education and the mean education of residents of census tracts where their children grew up are important determinants of children's education, the estimated parameters are not large enough for residential sorting by education (and income) to contribute substantially to the dispersion of education within the population.
While the literature on Tiebout sorting, or at least the theoretical one, has been able to explain stratification according to income across communities, it has not provided a natural benchmark against which to evaluate the extent of stratification and has predicted, in a sense, too much stratification. Recent attempts to remedy this include Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and Sieg (1999) . Epple and Platt show that if individuals differ with respect to income and to a preference parameter, then the resulting sorting at equilibrium is partial but incomplete. Individuals with identical incomes may be found in different communities at equilibrium, which broadly accords with the facts. Epple and Sieg estimate a model somewhat along the lines of Epple and Platt. They show that when income and a preference characteristic are assumed to vary across the population, then individuals sort themselves across communities, which are characterized by an ascending bundles property: communities may be ranked in terms of incomes, housing prices and community-specific public services. The most recent empirical work on Tiebout sorting by Hoyt and Rosenthal (1997) rejects the strict implications of Tiebout sorting that all individuals in a particular community would derive the same marginal benefit from local public goods.
Imperfect sorting across communities is consistent with a variety of motives. The extent in which it rests on preferences for public services is important for designing public policy. For example, local communities, state governments and even the U.S. government have staked out positions on the desirability of income (and ethnic) mixing in residential patterns and adopted policies to promote them. It matters for policy whether or not individuals want to be near others with particular characteristics. Communities are made up of smaller neighborhoods, whose characteristics (like patterns of building density and availability of amenities, etc.) and appeal are essential to determining the character of a community. This paper is also motivated by the fact that very little is known about income distributions at the microscopic level of residential neighborhoods. Hardman and Ioannides (1998) provide a qualitative description of sorting and mixing by income in the immediate neighborhoods surrounding a randomly chosen sample of urban dwellers. They use the neighborhood clusters data of the American Housing Survey for 1985 and 1993, which include information on the characteristics of ten closest neighbors of the basic random sample. Using U.S. government definitions of income categories, Hardman and Ioannides find that low income households are widely represented within these micro-neighborhoods: very low and extremely low income households are present, for example, in almost nine-tenths of all US neighborhoods. In three out of five neighborhoods sampled, the poorest two or three households (out of ten) come from the poorest 30 % of the population. High income households (the richest 30 %) are widely distributed. They are present in almost three fourths of all neighborhoods, and are represented by at least two or three households out of ten in about two in about two fifths of all neighborhoods. Mayer (1996) contrasts changes in inequality in urban areas using micro data from the March CPS.
The importance of such a microscopic scale of analysis is highlighted by the work of Thomas Schelling [ Schelling (1971; 1978) ]. Schelling studies spatial social structure, that is, the spatial outcomes that are possible where different individuals differ with respect to their preference for the characteristics of their immediate neighbors. Schelling's theory explains how individuals' interaction in their immediate neighborhoods can be responsible for key features of entire urban communities.
Neighbor-to-neighbor interactions can have large-scale consequences, because they can lead to chain reactions. One household moves for its own reasons, but if its move tips some balance, it may cause others to move, too. As a result, a variety of stable and unstable spatial outcomes are possible. In contrast, Tiebout sorting of individuals into communities rests on preferences with respect to local public goods. Schelling's model provides valuable theoretical underpinnings for the intuitive insight and growing body of evidence that immediate proximity is an important element of the social fabric of U.S.
cities. To understand patterns of mixing at larger scales, and to assess the feasibility and potential impact of deliberate policies aimed at income mixing, we clearly need also to examine mixing at smaller scales.
This paper aims at a better understanding of the distribution of income within neighborhoods and its relationship with the national income distribution. Neighborhoods in this paper are loosely defined to the smallest reasonable scale for which data are available: they consist of a dwelling unit and up to its ten nearest neighbors. Most previous work on neighborhoods has relied on census tracts as a concept of neighborhood. Census tracts comprise much larger population groups, that is 3500 to 5000 inhabitants. If individuals differ with respect to many characteristics, observed imperfect sorting would be consistent with different behavioral patterns. Sorting according to income is particularly interesting, as income is a central ingredient of economic models. Yet, economics research to date provides little or no direct guidance regarding sorting into small neighborhoods. Therefore, additional structure and, possibly, specific assumptions must be made about individuals's preferences over the characteristics of their neighbors. Differences among households with respect to income may simply be due differences in life cycle stages different households are found. Clearly, neighborhoods may be mixed in terms of people of different ages, whose current incomes differ because they happen to be on different points in their life cycles and but whose permanent incomes might differ by less. Still, such differences are factors that affect the character of neighborhoods.
Our results reveal the importance of accounting for neighbor selection bias. The samples of kernels and neighbors are not very different, when considered separately. If income data for kernels and neighbors are used simultaneously, then the extent of income mixing in neighborhoods is obscured and confused with dispersion of incomes across the entire economy. Our results show that treating kernels and neighbors alike, even while allowing for stochastic dependence across kernels and their neighbors, exaggerates national income inequality and confuses it with neighborhood income mixing. By allowing for incomes of neighbors to have different dispersion characteristics than the national income distribution, while controlling for the income of a typical neighbor, we may measure the outcome of neighborhood selection, i.e. sorting, in a reduced form fashion. We find, for example, that the correlation coefficient between incomes of a randomly chosen individual and her neighbors is, at around 0.3, moderate but statistically very significant. When the sets of neighbors' incomes are defined as conditional on those of their neighbor in common, then the data do support the notion that neighbors' incomes are dependent on those of their common neighbor, and very significantly, although weakly, correlated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model of neighborhood sorting and Section 3 the econometric models. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 presents the results and 6 concludes.
The Sorting Model
Let I denote a set comprising of all individual members of the economy at some point in time, possibly very large and therefore represented by a continuum, and let I denote the total population of the economy at the corresponding time, I = |I|. Time is not essential in our analysis, because we work with repeated cross sections and do not attempt to link the observations over time. We fix ideas and set notation as follows.
Let F (y) denote the distribution function of household income y in the entire economy. Suppose the population is distributed into K different geographical areas, to be referred to as neighborhoods,
. By definition, the decomposition of the population into neighborhoods ie exhaustive, so that I = K k=1 I k . In that case, the economy-wide, national, distribution of income among individuals, the national income distribution, is given by:
from which the density function follows by differentiation.
We say that the national income distribution exhibits perfect mixing, if all neighborhood income distributions are identical to the national one, that is, if Equ. (1) implies:
It exhibits perfect sorting, if the supports of the neighborhood income distributions do not overlap:
E.g., in the simplest possible case where the F k (y)'s are degenerate, then:
and where all the y k 's are all different. In that case, the national income distribution will be described by the discrete frequency distribution {(y k ,
The Epple-Sieg Model of Sorting
We use the basic model in Epple and Sieg (1999) to seek key characteristics of neighborhood income distributions that are associated with the general case of imperfect sorting of individuals into neighborhoods. The sorting model may be analyzed in terms of the standard tools of sample selection bias. Yet, it is the associated income distributions that have not really been analyzed in full detail. This is in part due to the fact that the econometric literature has sought to obtain suitable estimators for problems that are subject to sample selection bias rather than to identify the statistical characteristics of the associated income distributions. In a sense, this paper looks at estimates of magnitudes which sample selection correction considers auxiliary to the main task of correcting for selection bias.
We assume that all individuals make decisions at the same time about where to locate among k = 1, . . . , K neighborhoods. Individuals' preferences are defined in terms of their indirect utility functions, as functions of individual income y, of the price of housing in neighborhood k, P k , an observable variable in principle, and of a quality attribute of the neighborhood, the state of the neighborhood, g k . Following Epple and Sieg (1999) , we assume an indirect utility function for a household with income y residing in neighborhood k, as a function of (y, P k , g k ) of the form:
where > 0, is an individual characteristic, that is distributed across the population, possibly jointly with income y; ψ < 0, η < 0, ν > 0,and B > 0 are parameters which are constant across all agents.
To see how the assumption about preferences according to (4) serves to clarify sorting across neighborhoods, we may consider "indirect indifference" curves in (P k , g k ) space. Their slopes given by:
These curves are essential in characterizing neighborhood sorting for the following reason. Since they are monotonic in y and , they satisfy the single-crossing property with respect to income, y, and to the taste parameter, , given y. As Epple and Sieg, op. cit., show, this property is crucial for obtaining separating equilibria, with respect to both income, y and the taste parameter, . To see this intuitively, consider the indirect indifference curves for two values of income, y , y , y < y , with the same value of . As the indifference curve for y cuts the one for y from below, individuals with incomes equal to y are willing to bid a higher value to locate in any particular community, cet.
par.. 2 Therefore, a neighborhood with higher value of P k , holding g k constant, would be populated by households with higher incomes.
We index the K neighborhoods in individuals' opportunity sets, so that:
According to Epple and Sieg, op. cit. p. 651 , there must be an ordering of communities that must be confirmed at equilibrium. 3 We assume that this indexing coincides with the equilibrium ordering. We work out the specifics of selection which is likely to emerge under preferences (4). Next we seek to characterize the marginal density function for neighborhood k, f k ( ny) in terms of the joint distribution of preferences characteristics and income, (y, ), across the population.
The set of individuals j ∈ I k who reside in neighborhood k are characterized by the set of values (y j , j ) such that:
We follow Epple and Sieg (1999) but simplify by setting ν = 1 in which case lim ν=1 :
ny. It turns out that the boundary of neighborhoods k and k + 1 in (y, ) space is the straight line given by n − ψ ny = C k . Conditions (6) are transformed into:
where the C k 's are auxiliary variables defined by
Note that C k is increasing in g k and P k . Our assumptions about the ranking of the K neighborhoods imply that the C k 's, which are functions of the (
completeness, we define C 0 = −∞, and C K = ∞. The proposition that follows summarizes the implications of this model for the neighborhood income distributions. The proof of this proposition is rather straightforward and has been relegated to Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Let the distribution of ( ny, n ) be bivariate normal with parameters (µ y , µ , λ, σ y , σ ).

Part A. The distribution of income in neighborhood k, f k ( ny), is given by the marginal with respect
to ny, multiplied by the probability that n lies within the bounds given in (7) conditional on ny. That is,
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative standardized normal distribution function, the auxiliary variables
and G k is a normalizing constant, which is equal to the unconditional probability that an individual be in neighborhood k:
Part B. The income distribution in neighborhood k, f k ( ny), may under certain conditions be bimodal.
This result is interpreted as follows. Individual choices result in sorting into neighborhoods consisting of individuals with income distributed within the neighborhood according to the unconditional national income distribution, scaled by the difference between two suitable defined If individuals do not differ with respect to their evaluation of g k , then the sorting conditions are simplified. Under the normalizing assumption = 1, the sorting conditions (7) become:
These inequalities define bounds in terms of ny, and no integration with respect to is called for.
The resulting distributions may be described concicely by:
where ny lies in the interval defined by (12). The neighborhood income distributions are simply doubly truncated segments of the national distribution. They describe perfect sorting. If, on the other hand, individuals' evaluations of g differ, the neighborhood income distributions extend over the entire support of the national income distribution, even if income and the individual preference characteristic are uncorrelated. As long as taste heterogeneity is present, and even if it is uncorrelated with income, sorting according to income would be imperfect.
Careful inspection of the difference in the second term in the r.h.s. of (9) hints to the possibility that neighborhood income distributions could be bimodal. The weighting of the national distribution is accentuated between C k−1 and C k , with the no taste heterogeneity case being the extreme case, where the distribution has mass only between the two bounds. However, the clustering of incomes around the national mean suggests that a second mode may survive even after the national income distribution has been scaled down. This is clearly more likely to happen the further the bounds are away from the national mean. We note that a straightforward consequence of bimodality in this context would be that neighborhood distribution might have larger variance than the national distribution.
The fact that neighborhood income distributions depend upon the C k 's only is not a special property of the model in the absence of individual taste heterogeneity. In fact, as Lemmata 1 and 2, Epple and Sieg, op. cit., p. 654 show, the C k 's may be recursively defined in terms of the unconditional probabilities that individuals locate in neighborhoods k = 1, . . . , K. In our notation, if we normalize I to one, then
which along with C 0 = −∞, C K = ∞, define fully the C k 's. These auxiliary variables may be rightly referred to as community-specific intercepts, and serve as sufficient statistics.
The analysis so far has taken prices as given. Ultimately, of course, prices are endogenous.
Given individual valuations of neighborhood conditions, individuals bid for the privilege in locating in different neighborhoods. A complete analysis would require a more precise definition of a neighborhood in terms of the housing stock. Other interesting aspects of the neighborhood location problem, such as individuals' taking into consideration the characteristics of others who also choose to locate in the same neighborhood, also complicate the problem considerably. In the remainder of the discussion in this paper, we take prices as given. In an effort to account for variations in housing prices across the US, we use the full detail of geographic information which is available in our data in addition to incomes.
We note that the model of heterogeneous preferences introduced in (4) above may not be fully identified from income distribution data alone. Nonetheless, the model serves to structure the empirical investigation below.
Econometric Models
Suppose now that data are available in the form of a finite random sample of neighborhoods in the economy. Let different observations of neighborhoods be indexed by k, k = 1, . . . , K. The sample is made up of observations on incomes of a random subsample of the entire national sample,
. , K}, which may be treated as a representative sample drawn from the national income distribution. Each observation k is known as the kernel of neighborhood k, and ke is mnemonic for kernel. The AHS data provide information on the neighbors of each kernel. We use j = 1, . . . , n to index the sample of nearest neighbors to kernel k in her neighborhood, I k . The set of nearest neighbors of k in the data will be referred to as neighborhood cluster k. In practice, the number of neighbors differs across kernels because of missing values and changes in sampling procedures. We return to this issue below.
This sampling procedure samples K neighborhoods, and conditional on a randomly chosen member in each neighborhood, their n nearest neighbors. We shall, for simplicity, consider that neighborhoods are spatially homogeneous groups, so that the samples
that is sets of random vectors drawn from the distribution function of incomes in neighborhood clus-
That is, Y k is a random vector of size n whose components are i.i.d., conditional on y k , drawn from probability density function f k (y kj |y k ), j = 1, . . . , n. It will be useful to define, for every neighborhood cluster k, the sample maximum and minimum, MAX k = max j∈I k {y kj },
The distribution of income within each neighborhood, according to Proposition 1, and given housing prices and the states of neighborhoods, depends on the parameters of the national income distribution, of the distribution of the taste parameter evaluating the state of each neighborhood, and on the remainder of preference characteristics. However, as mentioned above, the communityspecific intercepts help simplify the estimation problem. In principle, it should be possible to handle the problem of estimating the neighborhood income distributions, that were defined in Section 2 above, by means of maximum likelihood methods. Unfortunately, this direct approach did not work. 4
4 I am truly grateful to Dennis Epple for his generosity in working out the following detailed suggestions. Since a neighborhood is a very small share of the metropolitan population, the integral between the upper and lower neighborhood boundaries for a given value of income can be written in terms of the density. Then, assuming all neighborhoods are of the same size provides a normalization that can be exploited by completing the square of the exponents of the likelihood function and then integrating over (−∞, ∞) . In this fashion, a density of the sample of income observations for a given neighborhood can be written, conditional on the unobserved community-specific intercept. When neighborhoods are small and the sample of neighborhoods is randomly drawn, the community-specific intercepts are normally distributed. This distribution permits integrating out the community-specific intercepts to yield a likelihood function written in terms of observables and parameters to be estimated. It is very unfortunate that maximum likelihood estimation along these lines did not work out for computational reasons, in spite of a relatively
We therefore resort to use of class of parametric models as reduced-form approximations of the true model. This approach can handle some important hypotheses derived from the theoretical analysis and generally helps to further clarify the properties of neighborhood income distributions.
A particularly interesting hypothesis, derived from the theoretical analysis, is that neighborhoods are imperfectly segregated in a manner that implies higher variance than the national income distribution.
Sample design suggests that we could take as the maintained hypothesis that the incomes of kernels in the data are a random sample from the national income distribution. We shall use upper case Y from now on to denote log incomes. Let the distribution of log incomes among kernels, Y = ny, be normally distributed with mean and variance denoted, respectively, by µ ke and ς 2 .
Let the distribution of log incomes of neighbors also be normal but correlated with that of their kernel, that is, let µ ne , σ 2 , ρ denote, respectively, the mean income of neighbors (mnemonic ne, from neighbors), its variance, and the correlation coefficient between incomes of neighbors and kernels. We think such a specification of the distribution of income of neighbors conditional on that of their kernels follows the intuition that emanates from Proposition 1. 
We note that maximum likelihood estimations with this model allows for data for both kernels and neighbors to contribute to the estimated parameters of the national income distribution.
In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the model whose log likelihood function is given by Equ. (15) 
The Data
The AHS is a panel of housing units, which involves in its entirety more than 50,000 dwelling units that are interviewed each two years, and serves the basis for US housing statistics. We explore a somewhat neglected aspect of the data, data on neighborhood clusters, which are available only for years 1985, 1989, and 1993 . In those years only, a random sample of, respectively 670, 805, and 1014 urban units were selected and for each one of them originally up to ten and later on more neighbor units were interviewed. Each neighborhood cluster is defined by its kernel and includes all neighbors. 5 Restricting attention to regular interviews only (that is those with an actual household head) reduces the number of available points. 6 Also, additional units in existing clusters were included in 1989 to reflect additional units that had been added within the perimeter of the "neighborhood." By 1993, a maximum of 20 neighboring units were allowed per cluster. 7 In view of the change in the number of observations over time, and after considerable experimentations, we decided to conduct separate parametric estimations with data for neighborhood clusters that include the same number of observations, that is n = 10 neighbors, for 1985, 1989 and 1993, which is of course a subset of the data, as well as the full sample, in which the number of observations may vary across neighborhoods. The nonparametric estimations, however, have been conducted with the full data.
We should also note that by full data we mean the sample of owner occupants. We have restricted this study to that sample for two main reasons. First, we wish to maintain comparability among several studies of neighborhood effects, such Ioannides (1999) and Ioannides and Zabel (2000) , for example. Second, renters and owners could employ very different approaches to the evaluation of neighborhoods where they wish to reside, in part because of different time horizons, with renters generally being younger and much more mobile. In spite of these limitations, our data are quite representative of both the entire AHS data and national statistics for the US. This 5 Only a handful of papers, that is, de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1995) , Gabriel and Rosenthal (1995; , Hoyt and Rosenthal (1995) , Hardman and Ioannides (1998) , Ioannides (1999; 2000) , Ioannides and Seslen (1999) , Ioannides and Zabel (2000) , and Kiel and Zabel (1998) have utilized the AHS clusters data to date. Kiel and Zabel compare the performance of clusters data against census tract level attributes by means of privileged access to census-tract coding of the data. Ioannides (1999) aims at understanding neighborhood interactions in housing consumption and maintenance decisions. Ioannides and Seslen (1999) merge AHS clusters data and PSID micro data to compare neighborhood income and wealth distributions.
6 See the Appendix in Ioannides (1999) for further details on the count of observations. 7 I am grateful to Barbara T. Williams, US Bureau of the Census, for this clarification.
established by Appendix C.
Results
We present in this part of the paper results according to the three stages of estimations outlined above of statistical and econometric procedures to discern patterns in neighborhood income distributions. We order randomly the observations for each cluster into a vector of ten observations and associate them with their kernel. We start by an examination of the importance of the cluster structure of the data.
The Neighborhood Cluster Structure of the Data
We report first estimated correlation coefficient among neighbors, for each of the three waves of data, 1985, 1989 and 1993 . The estimated correlation coefficients, respectively, among the elements of Decomposing the variance of log incomes, separately for 1985, 1989 and 1993, in terms of clusterspecific effects, we find that the cluster structure yields the following. For 1985, cluster fixed effects explain 31% of variance, and cluster random effects 25.9%; for 1989, cluster fixed effects explain 30% of variance, and cluster random effects 24.8%; and for 1993, cluster fixed effects explain 27.1% of variance, and cluster random effects 21.4%. In view of the fact that these estimations are conducted with data from the entire US, it is quite surprising, at least to me, that only a small portion of the variance is explained by cluster-specific effects.
In this connection, let us recall the finding by Epple and Sieg (1999) , p. 671, that 89% of the total variance of income in the Boston metropolitan area is accounted for by within-community variance.
This leaves 11% of the variance to be explained by inter-community variance, the counterpart to our cluster-specific effects. Our finding is, mutatis mutandis, 8 compatible with theirs, and especially if one were to consider that a single metropolitan area (Boston) is most likely more homogeneous than the entire US.
While the decomposition of variance gives a sense of the importance of income sorting, it would be interesting to know how closely correlated incomes of neighbors are in a group sense. Such a group correlation coefficient has been used in the literature as a measure of segregation. See Kremer (1997) and Kremer and Maskin (1996) , who show that it may be computed as the R 2 from a regression of incomes against a set of dummies for all clusters in the data. 
With perfect sorting, the first component would be relative small. The larger is the first component relatively to the total variance the more imperfect sorting is. Actually, the Epple-Sieg is cast in terms of the importance of taste heterogeneity relative to income heterogeneity. If taste heterogeneity is more important relative to income heterogeneity, community income distributions would be quite similar. Therefore, the finding that the first component is large relative to the second suggests that taste heterogeneity is more important than income as a determinant of sorting across communities. 9 The expression for this correlation coefficient is:
We suggest that the general similarity of the estimates for the correlation of incomes within tracts and within clusters implies that this analysis of this paper is not subject to the so-called modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) from geostatistics and statistical geography. That is, the MAUP problem in spatial statistics concerns the influence of the level of aggregation (scale) within which a spatial variable is sampled on relationships between any two (or more) spatial variables.
The recent statistical geography literature on MAUP emphasizes three different ways to address the different scales problem, that is distinguishing between subsetting, stratification and aggregation [ Cressie (1996) , p. 167 ]. Working with samples of different clusters within a census tract involves stratification, except that the "strata" have been randomly selected. On that score, it is encouraging that the estimated correlation coefficients from those very different samples are so close to one another, suggesting that neighborhood clusters are indeed representative random samples of census tracts.
Nonparametric Estimations
We plotted the data and estimated nonparametric models for the univariate densities. We found no evidence of bimodality in the data. The descriptive statistics for the data used in these estimations are given in Table 1 incomes increases less than proportionately with those of their kernels'. Careful observations of the contour maps suggests that, generally, the variance of the income of neighbors conditional on the income of kernels, declines with kernel income. It is interesting to consider adapting the estimation so that to each kernel one associate the entire sample of neighbors' incomes. This is accomplished in a linear model by means of the regressions which follow.
Neighbors' Incomes Conditional on Kernels' Incomes
We report estimation results for seemingly unrelated regressions with a model of neighbors' incomes as a function of the respective kernel's income, separately for each of the three waves of the data:
where α is a 10-vector of intercepts and β a 10-vector of coefficients. We allow for general correlation matrix for the 10-vector of stochastic shocks k .
The estimates of the components of β, with t statistics given in parentheses and ranging roughly within similar bounds, range from .3809 (6.02) to .5276 (8.56), for 1985, from .3163 (5.15) to .4947 (9.33), for 1989, and from .2457 (4.13) to .4997 (8.72), for 1993. Interestingly, allowing for a variable number of neighbors and thus extending the size of the data set does not reveal any noticeable differences. The estimated correlation matrices for the k 's are generally smaller than the raw ones, reported above, rather uniform and still different from 0. They range from .2179 to .3992, for 1985, from .1595 to .3570, for 1989, and from .1392 to .4041, for 1993. These results are in broad agreement with the nonparametric estimation results reported in subsection 5.2 just above. As we saw there, the mode of the distributions of neighbors's incomes, conditional on those of their kernels' incomes, increases with the kernel's income but by less than proportionately to it.
Maximum Likelihood Estimations of Neighborhood Income Distributions
An important feature of the parametric results with neighbors' incomes conditional on those of their kernels is that the correlations among all neighbors' incomes do not differ very much. We report estimations with models that would hopefully provide additional intuition about the phenomenon of the neighborhood income sorting. Specifically, Model 5, which is described in Section 3 above, imposes a restricted structure of correlation relative to the model in section 5.3 above.
We report in Tables 2 -7 We report in detail below in Table 2 the results for Models 0 -5 for 1985. Model 0 below imposes the same means and variances across kernels and neighbors. Model 1 allows, in addition, for correlation between neighbors' and kernels' incomes. Model 2 allows the means to vary and also allows for correlation between neighbors' and kernels' incomes. Models 3, 4 and 5 are like Models 0, 1, and 2, respectively, except that in addition the requirement is imposed that all data lie between the observed minimum and maximum among the incomes in each neighborhood.
For each of these models, the second column in Table 2 reports, in addition, estimations for an extended model where dummies are introduced to allow for the means of kernels and of neighbors to vary according to four US Census regions, climatic regions, and categories of urbanicity. Such an extended list of regressors is included in order to account for the fact that the determinants of neighborhood sorting, according to the model presented in Section 2, may in general vary across different regions and geographic areas with different density characteristics.
The results for 1989 are quite similar to those of 1985, but those for 1993 show some important differences. The estimate of the correlation coefficient is much smaller, at .163 (9.15) , and the variances of kernels and neighbors are much nearer one another, 1.511 (13.53) and 1.590 (104.31), respectively. However, when the data are grouped by region and, alternatively, by category of urbanicity the decrease in the correlation coefficient is hard to explain. Tables 4 and 5 The availability of separate estimations when we allow for the stochastic structure to vary by region, as in Tables 4 and 5 , and by urbanicity, as in Tables 6 and 7 , prompts a number of remarks.
The differences between the variances of kernel and neighbor incomes appear to be eliminated when we estimate separate models for the four regions, but remain quite pronounced when we estimate separate models for the four types of urban areas. It would be interesting to reconcile our findings with evidence of widening income segregation in urban areas along with a slight narrowing of racial segregation and an increase in income inequality, as reported by Mayer (1996) Proof: Part A. The probability density function of income in neighborhood k is obtained as the density of y, times the probability that n satisfies (7), given ny. By assumption, the distribution of n conditional on ny, is normal with mean µ + σ σy λ( ny − µ y ), and variance σ 2 (1 − λ 2 ). Then the probability distribution is given by the marginal distribution of ny, weighted by the mass of the doubly truncated distribution function of n , with lower and upper bounds defined by Equ. (7). The auxiliary variables Ω k and ω transform the truncation bounds in (7) . The probability that n falls in that interval is given by Φ (Z k (y)) − Φ (Z k−1 (y)) , which is a function of ny. For the resulting expression to be a density function it must integrate to 1, and thus the need for a normalizing constant G k . Q.E.D. 
Model 0
The LLF defined for each kernel and its neighbors:
where µ, σ 2 , are the unknown mean and variance, common for neighbors and kernel, to be estimated.
Model 1
where µ, σ 2 , ρ are the unknown mean and variance, and correlation coefficient between neighbors and kernel to be estimated.
Model 2
where µ ke , µ ne , ς 2 , σ 2 , ρ are the unknown mean for kernels and for neighbors, and variance for kernels and for neighbors, and correlation coefficient between neighbors and kernel to be estimated.
Model 3
where Φ(·) denotes the standardized normal cumulative function, and µ, σ 2 , are the unknown mean and variance, common for neighbors and kernel, to be estimated.
Model 4
where Φ(·) denotes the standardized normal cumulative function, and µ, σ 2 , ρ are the unknown mean, variance, common for neighbors and kernel, and correlation coefficient between neighbors and kernel, to be estimated.
Model 5
where Φ(·) denotes the standardized normal cumulative function, and µ ke , µ ne , ς 2 , σ 2 , ρ are the unknown means for kernels and for neighbors, and variance for kernels and for neighbors, and correlation coefficient between neighbors and kernel to be estimated. 
